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Despite the development of the optimal taxation theory , few of  the practicing tax economists 
question the traditional wisdom that making tax rates flat will lead to a more efficient tax system. Practicing 
tax economists seem to have an intuition that even if the uniform tax structure may not be the most efficient, 
it may be a close approximation. The present paper survey the literature that provides theoretical 




  1￿. Introduction  
 
Most economists used to advocate uniform commodity taxation under the presumption that the elasticity of the 
labor supply is negligible. Indeed, Musgrave’s celebrated textbook on public finance (Musgrave, 1959), for 
example, mentions Ramsey only once, and that in a footnote. Over the last thirty years, however, the impressive 
growth of the field of optimal taxation theory has reminded us that the uniform commodity tax is theoretically 
groundless in an economy with an elastic labour supply.  Among theorists of public economics, the old doctrine 
of uniform commodity taxation has been replaced by the theory of optimal taxation.  
But practising tax economists have been reluctant to accept the prescriptions of optimal taxation 
theory. The major post-war tax debates that led to the 1982 US tax reform or the 1989 Japanese reform illustrate 
this reluctance. In these debates, few questioned the traditional wisdom that making tax rates flat by eliminating 
deductions and exclusions will lead to a more efficient tax system. Indeed, “Level the playing field” was the 
slogan of the 1982 US tax reform. Practising tax economists seem to have an intuition that, even if the uniform 
tax structure is not absolutely efficient, it is sufficiently efficient for practical purposes in the real world. The 
problem is that they have been relying on this intuition rather than on analysis.  
Hatta (1986), Hatta and Haltiwanger (1986), Fukushima and Hatta (1989), and Hatta (1993) 
attempted to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the practitioner’s intuition in a model that is perfectly 
consistent with optimal tax theory. . They described practical routes through which tax reforms aimed at 
uniformity could be carried out, starting from an arbitrarily given tax structure. 
However, each of the above papers focuses on different aspects of tax reforms. Moreover, results in 
this literature are stated in terms of ad valorem tax rates based on producers’ prices. 
The aim of the present paper is to survey this literature in a unified framework and to simplify 
considerably the statements and proofs of the theorems in the literature by stating them in terms of an ad valorem 
tax rate based on consumers’ prices. 
Section 2 reviews the issues and Section 3 outlines the model. Section 4 gives the basic formula of tax 
  2reforms showing their welfare impacts, and Section 5 discusses the Inverse Elasticity Rule in terms of the basic 
formula.   
Section 6 presents the basic results in terms of this literature, Section 7 shows how to proceed beyond 
the initial stage of tax reform, and Section 8 discusses broad-based taxes within a group of close substitutes. 
Section 9 relates the empirical estimation of optimal tax rates to the analysis of the present paper, Section 10 
discusses the equity issue, and Section 11 concludes. 
 
 
2. Revenue-constrained optimum tax rules: the issues 
 
Suppose that one of the goods consumed by a country is leisure,
 1 and call goods other than leisure 
“commodities”. Then the phrase “all commodities” will not include leisure, while the phrase “all goods” will 
cover all commodities and leisure. The excise tax structure with an equal tax rate on all goods is called a 
proportional tax, while that on all commodities is called a uniform tax. Thus, a proportional tax is a combination 
of a uniform tax and a tax on leisure at an equal rate. 
Under a proportional tax, the budget plane of any consumer becomes parallel to the consumer’s 
budget plane before taxes. This combination of excise taxes amounts to a lump-sum tax, since a tax-payer cannot 
then reduce the amount of his tax obligation by changing the consumption mix. A proportional tax, therefore, 
attains the optimum under the constraint of raising a given amount of government revenue. 
2 
It is not feasible, however, to impose a proportional tax on all goods, because leisure is untaxable. A 
tax-payer has a strong incentive to understate his leisure consumption; by doing so he is able to reduce his 
claimed tax base for the leisure tax. Thus, the tax office cannot gather precise information on the leisure 
consumption of each tax-payer, and hence cannot levy taxes on leisure.  
                                                             
1 Note that the word "leisure" here is used in the sense of non-working hours. 
2 A uniform tax encourages leisure consumption, but a tax on leisure consumption neutralizes that effect. Hence 
a proportional tax can attain an optimum. 
  3  The tax office, however, can obtain data on a tax-payer’s wage income. In the real economy, 
therefore, taxes are imposed on wage income, rather than on leisure consumption. An important difference 
between the two taxes is that a tax on leisure discourages leisure consumption, while a tax on wage income 
encourages it. This is because the leisure tax is an excise tax on the total consumption of leisure, while the 
wage tax is an excise tax on the net supply of leisure, i.e. an excise tax on the net consumption of leisure with 
a negative rate.  
Unlike a tax on leisure, a tax on wage income reinforces the over-consumption of leisure caused by 
commodity taxes. Therefore, a simultaneous imposition of taxes on all commodities and wage income cannot 
attain the optimum under the constraint of raising a given government revenue, because it necessarily enlarges 
the distortion in the leisure-commodity consumption choice. This distortion is ultimately created by the 
non-availability of a leisure tax. 
However, the distortion can be partially mitigated by making the commodity tax structure non-uniform. For 
example, imposing a high tax rate on complements of leisure (e.g. yachts and concerts) and subsidizing 
substitutes for leisure (e.g. dish-washers and microwave ovens) will reduce leisure consumption, serving to 
counteract the over-consumption of leisure induced by the commodity taxes in general. But the type of 
non-uniformity of tax rates among commodities, which reduces the distortion in the leisure-commodity 
consumption choice, will create new distortions in the choice among commodities, as is eloquently stated by 
Musgrave and Musgrave (1980,p286): “A tax on Pintos can be avoided by buying some other car; a tax on cars in 
general can be avoided, if less conveniently, by taking buses or by flying; but a general sales tax can be avoided 
only by consuming less and saving.” In making commodity tax rates non-uniform, therefore, a policy-maker 
faces a trade-off between distortion in the leisure-commodity consumption choice and distortions among 
commodities. The optimal tax structure is one that strikes a balance in this trade-off. Optimal tax theory 
characterizes the structure of such taxes.  
  In reality, it is not easy to estimate the optimal tax rate precisely, because that would require a precise 
estimate of demand parameters. The present paper shows how to approximate the optimal rate and how to reform 
  4an arbitrarily given tax structure towards such an optimal rate. 
 
 
3. The model 
 
Consider an economy with only one consumer, who consumes leisure and  commodities. The consumer is 
assumed to be a perfect competitor and his compensated demand function for leisure and commodities is 
expressed as  , where  is his utility level,  is his net demand vector and 
is his price vector, with the superscript  denoting variables relating to leisure. Thus, his 
demand vector satisfies his budget constraint 
n
n x ) , ( u q x x =
) ,
1 n q Λ
u ) , , , (
1 0 x x x Λ = ′
0 , (
0 q q q = ′
 
0 = ′x q ,                                                                   (1) 
 
which may be rewritten as  . The last equality states that his expenditure 
equals wage income, since   denotes net supply of his labour. We assume that   and x  for 
j = 1, 2,…, n. The first inequality simply states that the consumer is a net supplier of leisure. 
) (
0 0 1 1 x q x q x q
n n − = + +Λ
0 x − 0
0 < x 0 >
j
  The government provides a fixed vector    of public goods, financing it by 
ad valorem excise taxes on net consumption. The excise tax on the net consumption of leisure amounts to a wage 
tax. 
) , , , (
1 0 n g g g g Λ =
Technology can be represented by a linear production possibility frontier, and in equilibrium we have 
 
  0 = ′ + ′ g p x p ,                                                        (2) 
 
where   and   Then   (i=1,…, n.) represents the marginal cost of producing 
a commodity in terms of labour-hours used. For simplicity, we say that 
) ,..., , ( '
1 0 n p p p p = 1
0 = p
i p
p  is the vector of marginal costs. 
  5Equation (2) may be rewritten as  
   
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 ... ... x g p g p g p x p x p
n n n n − = + + + + + +
 Then, the LHS represents the demand for labour and the RHS represents the supply for labour. Since producers 
are perfect competitors,  p must be proportional to the vector of producers’ prices in equilibrium. We choose the 
unit of measurement so that this factor of proportionality is 1. 
Let   be the ad valorem tax rate of the  -th good relative to its consumer price  . Then we have   i t i
i q
 
i     f o r   i   =   0 ,   1 , … ,   n .                       ( 3 )  
i
i p q t = − ) 1 (
 
The positive wage tax rate implies  , since the consumer receives less than what is paid by the producer. 
Noting that 
0 0 < t
p  is fixed in our model, we have 
 
) (t q q = ,  
 
where   is the vector of tax rates. There are no other taxes in our model. In particular, there 
is no lump―sum tax. 
) ,..., , ( ' 1 0 n t t t t =
We assume that the government spends all its tax revenue on the purchase of the public good. Hence 
. But this is already implied by (1) and (2).  g p x p q ′ = − ) (
   Letting   and substituting the compensated demand function for  g p r ′ = x  in (1) and (2), we obtain  
0 ) , ( = ′ u q x q   and   0 ) , ( = + ′ r u q x p  
Substituting (4) for   in these two equations, we have   q
 
                                                                  (5)  0 ) ), ( ( = u t q m
0 ) ), ( ( ' = +r u t q x p                                                            (6) 
 
  6where  . These two equations contain  ) , ( ) , ( u q x q u q m ′ ≡ 3 + n  variables,  i.e. t ,   and  u r . When  1 + n  
of them are exogenously given, these equations can determine the equilibrium values of the remaining two 
variables. For example, when   and  1 0,..., − n t t r  are given, the system of equations (5) and (6) can determine 
the equilibrium values of   and u .   n t
  74. The welfare effect of a revenue-neutral tax reform 
 
4.1 Decomposition 
To examine the welfare effect of a revenue-neutral commodity tax reform, we first analyse a formula that shows 
whether or not a particular revenue-neutral tax reform improves efficiency.  
Throughout the rest of this section, we make the following assumption: 
 
(A1)  The tax rates of goods 1 and  are both revenue-increasing.  n
 
This means that raising the tax rate of commodity 1 (commodity  ), keeping all other tax rates constant, 
increases the revenue.  
n
 
Lemma (Hatta, 1986): Under (A1), efficiency is improved by an increase in    1 t
accompanied by a revenue-neutralizing decrease in   if and only if  n t
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3 Lemma 1 is obtained by examining the effect of an increase in   upon  in (5) and (6) while treating  and 
as the only  ndogeneous variables.In Lemma 1 of Hatta(1986),the excise tax rate  'was defined by 
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≡ η . 
The RHS of (8) can be decomposed in a number of ways depending on the purpose of the decomposition. Noting 
that 
 for  any  i , 







j η  
                                                            
equation (8) may be rewritten as
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The term   in the RHS of (10) represents the wage elasticity of compensated demand for the first commodity, 
while   represents the elasticity of compensated demand for the  th commodity with respect to the price of 





The first term of the RHS of (10) may be called the leisure substitution term, while the second term 
may be called the commodity substitution term. The welfare effect of the tax reform can be studied by signing the 
two terms.   
 
4.2  Uniform tax as the initial condition. 
In deriving policy implications from (7) and (10), first consider the situation where the initial commodity tax 
rates are equal. Then the second term in (10) vanishes, and the first term alone dictates the direction of the welfare 
effect. Since   holds in this situation, this reform improves efficiency if and only if  n t t = 1
  
1
0 0 > −η η
n                                                          (11)  . 0
This implies that a higher tax rate should be imposed on complements of leisure than on substitutes of leisure.  
This reform works because it discourages the consumption of leisure, mitigating the distortions created by the 
 
4 This is the counterpart of (31) in Hatta (1986).  
  9non-availability of the leisure tax. This observation, due to Corlett and Hague (1953), crucially depends upon the 
assumption that the initial tax rate structure is uniform. In the two-commodity and leisure case that Corlett and 
Hague considered, however, this local examination was sufficient to enable them to conclude that a complement 
of leisure should be taxed at a higher rate than a substitute of leisure. More generally, the commodity that is less 
substitutable for leisure should be taxed at a higher rate, regardless of the magnitude of those substitability 
between the two commodities. In an economy with more than two commodities, however, local examination of a 
uniform commodity tax structure does not give useful qualitative information about the nature of the optimum 
commodity tax structure. Nor does it tell us how to proceed with a tax reform once we change the tax structure of 
an arbitrarily chosen commodity pair starting from uniformity. 
In order to determining the desirable direction of a tax reform when a non-uniform initial tax structure 




5. How useful is the inverse elasticity rule? 
It is useful to examine the implication of (10) for optimal tax rules, especially the Inverse Elasticity Rule, before 
discussing tax reforms. 
 
5.1 Optimal tax structure 
A tax vector   is called an optimal tax structure if it maximizes  in the model of (5) and (6) for a fixed  t u r . 
Thus, an optimal tax structure is the solution for   of the following model:  t
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Optimal tax rules are obtained from the optimality condition of this problem. In view of Lemma 1,   






5.2  The inverse wage elasticity rule  
When cross elasticities among commodities are zero, i.e. when  
 
      o
j
i = η
   if    and  if   ,                                                (12)  j i ≠ 1 , ≥ j i
 
the commodity substitution term in (10) vanishes, and hence the leisure substitution term in (10) must also vanish 
at the optimal tax structure, since ￿ then. Thus, the optimal tax rates for   and t are attained at the levels 
where  
1 t n
    
1
0 0 1 0 0 ) ( ) ( η η t t t t
n
n − = −
holds, regardless of the tax rates of other commodities.Define the intrinsic tax rate of the commodity i by 
. Then the above equality may be rewritten as   .   o i
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n n
When the optimal tax structure is attained without keeping any commodity tax rate fixed, similar 
results hold for all commodity pairs, and we have  
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at the optimal tax structure. Thus the intrinsic tax rate of a commodity is inversely proportional to the wage 
elasticity of demand for that commodity at the optimum  when (12) holds. This may be called the Inverse Wage 
Elasticity Rule, which is Proposition 4 of Hatta (1993). 
 
  115.3 Inverse elasticity rule 
Among the optimal tax rules, the Inverse Elasticity Rule (in terms of own elasticities of demand) is the best 
known and has been applied widely in practice. I now show that the own elasticities of demand are not as 
important as is generally believed in ranking tax rates. 
  Under (12), it also holds that
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Thus, (13) may be rewritten as  
 
                                                        (15￿ 
n






In words, the intrinsic commodity tax rate is inversely proportional to the own demand elasticity of that 
commodity. This is called the Inverse Elasticity Rule and is due to Ramsey (1927).
6 This implies that a lower tax 
rate should be imposed on a commodity with higher demand elasticity when condition (12) holds.  
In the real world, a commodity with a high demand elasticity is usually a strong substitute for another 
commodity. But the Inverse Elasticity Rule only considers the situation where even a highly demand elastic 
commodity has no substitutes among commodities; such a commodity has a high demand elasticity only because 
it is closely substitutable for leisure. It is not easy to come up with an example of such a commodity. The Inverse 
Elasticity Rule, therefore, does not have the general applicability as would first appear.  
 
5.4 Wage elasticity rule vs own elasticity rule 
                                                             
5 This follows directly by applying (12) to  .  0 ..... 1 0 = + + +
i
n
i i η η η
6 This rule is usually derived for the case of  =0, where   hold for all i. Ramsey himself derived this 
formula for uncompensated elasticities. 
0 t i
i t = 0 τ
  12In Section 4.2, we noted that in the two commodity economy, the commodity with the higher wage elasticity will 
necessarily have the lower optimal tax rate, even when the two commodities are substitutable. Unless the two 
commodities are independent, however, the ranking of the optimal tax rates can be the opposite of what is implied 




This may be seen most clearly by considering a tax reform in a economy with two-substitutable commodities 
when a uniform tax is imposed initially, i.e. when  
2 1 t t = .                                                               (16) 
We know from (10) that under this initial condition increasing   and decreasing   improves welfare if and 
only if  
1 t 2 t
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Inequality (17) may be rewritten in terms of own elasticities   and   as  . This 
holds even if  , as long as  . This implies that raising the tax rate of the commodity 
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The ranking of optimal tax rates implied by the Inverse Wage Elasticity Rule is not dependent upon 
the assumption of zero cross elasticities among commodities. On the other hand, the ranking implication of the 
Inverse Elasticity Rule follows from that of the Inverse Wage Elasticity Rule and the fact that (14) holds under 
the assumption of zero cross elasticities among commodities. In this sense, the qualitative implication of the 
Inverse Wage Elasticity Rule is robust, unlike the qualitative implication of the Inverse Elasticity rule. 
 
6. The first stage of tax reform toward uniformity 
 
7 This follows from (9). 
  13Optimal tax rules are obtained from the optimality conditions, which implicitly contain tax rates as variables. 
Optimal tax rules give insightful characterizations of optimal tax rates,
8 but they do not give guidance as to the 
direction in which the tax structure should be reformed, unless the exact point estimates of demand elasticities of 
all goods is known.  
The theory of revenue-constrained tax reform, unlike the theory of optimal tax, gives explicit criteria 
about whether or not a particular tax reform can improve efficiency without requiring precise point estimates of 
the demand elasticities of all goods, but instead only the signs and the relative magnitudes of demand elasticities 
of a selected number of goods.  
Let us now consider the situation where the initial tax structure is non-uniform, satisfying 
 
  , 1 2 1 n n t t t t < ≤ ≤ < − Λ . 
  0 < t 0                                                                (18) 
  
                                                            
 




(A2) (a) The first commodity is substitutable for all other commodities. (b) The  th commodity is 
substitutable for all other commodities.
n
 
In other words, the commodity substitution term is positive when commodities with extreme tax rates are 
substitutable for all other commodities.  
Lemma and (10) immediately yield the following proposition. 
 
 
8 e.g. Sandmo (1976), Auerbach (1986), and Hatta (1993). 
9 Condition (a) implies that   and   for  i t t < 1 0
1 > i x , ,..., 2 n i =  while condition (b) implies that   
and   for i . 
n i t t <
0 >
n
i x 1 − n ,..., 1 =
  14Proposition 1 (Hatta, 1986, p.106): Consider the initial tax structure satisfying (18). Then efficiency is improved 
by an increase in   accompanied by a simultaneous reduction in   so as to maintain the initial revenue level 
if 
1 t n t
 
1
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n
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holds in addition to (A1) and (A2).   
 
Under (18), inequality (19) is automatically satisfied if the  th good is more substitutable for leisure 
than the first good, i.e. if  
n
    





    
Thus, the revenue-constrained squeezing of extreme commodity tax rates improves efficiency when (18), (A2) 
and (20) are satisfied. This may be viewed as a generalization of the Corlett-Hague (1953) result to the situation 
where the initial commodity tax structure is not uniform.  
 
Even if (20) is violated, however, (19) can still be satisfied under (18).  Wh 0 0 en  0 − = t 3 . ,  1 = t  
3 . 0 , for example, we h and  = n t ave  50 . 1 ) ( ) ( 0 1 0 = − − t t t tn ;  (19) is satisfied even w  
1
0 η  is greater 
 
n
0 η  by 50 %. When the initial commodity tax rates are divergent, condition (19) is hardly restricti
hen
than ve.  
Besides, (19) is only a part of a set of sufficient conditions for efficiency improvement, and hence, even 
if it is violated, the squeezing of the tax rates can improve efficiency under condition (A2). This is because, even 
when the leisure substitution term is negative, the whole of expression (10) may be positive owing to the 
positivity of the commodity substitution term. Thus, when commodities are substitutable, the commodity 
substitution term pulls tax rates towards uniformity. 
  15These observations imply the following. 
 
 term.  
 
utable. 
(A4)Unless commodity 1 is strongly complementary with leisure or co modity n  is  strongly 
substitutable for leisure, the sign of the commodity substitution term can easily dominate the sign of the 
leisure substitution
m
Moreover, other things being equal, the value of the commodity substitution term becomes larger, and 
the “pulling power” stronger, as the gap bet een  n t and  1 t  increases.  When the initial commodity tax 
structure is divergent, therefore, a tax change towards uniformity is likely to improve welfare regardless of the 
relative magnitu s of η and 
2





Practitioners of tax policy usually recommend the equalization of tax rates so as to reduce distortions 
among commodities, without paying much attention to wage elasticities. The positivity of the commodity 
substitution term justifies their hunch.  
Now note that condition (A2) can be generalized. For example, the first half of the commodity 
substitution term can be positive, i.e.  
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Thus, we need a new definition of substitution between a commodity and a composite commodity. We 
say good   is substitutable for the composite good   with t  as its reference rate if   i J k
    0 > − ∑
i
j j k t t η
∈J j
                                                           (22) 
  16holds.
10 Under this condition, the compensated demand for good   is increased when prices of all goods in   
are increased in proportion to the distance between   and the tax rate of each good.  
i J
k t
  Proposition 1 holds even when (A2) is replaced by the following condition. 
 
(A3)The first commodity is substitutable for the composite good consisting of all other commodities with   as 
its reference rate, and the -th commodity is substitutable for the composite good consisting of all other 
commodities with n  as its reference rate.
1 t
  n
  t  
 
This condition may hold even if good   has a strong complement. For example, suppose that the highest tax 
rate is imposed on wine, and that wine is a complement of wine glasses but is a substitute for all other 
commodities. Then (A3) is satisfied as long as wine is “on average” substitutable for other commodities, in the 
sense that wine is substitutable for the composite good consisting of all other commodities, with the tax rate of 




6. Next stages of tax reform towards uniformity 
As the extreme tax rates are squeezed, (18) will eventually be violated; either  2 1 t t =  or t will be 
reached. Suppose that the former takes place first. Then a joint increase in   and   will improve efficiency 
when conditions similar to those of Proposition 1 hold.  
n n t = −1
1 t 2 t
 
Proposition 2  (Fukushima and Hatta, 1989): Consider the initial tax structure satisfying  
 
      t , 1 1 1 n m m k k t t t t t = = < < < < = = + + Λ Λ Λ  
0 0 < t ￿@ .                                                                (23) 
                                                             
10 See Figure 1 of Fukushima and Hatta(1989) for an illustration of this concept. 
  17 
Then efficiency will be improved by an equal increase of   accompanied by a simultaneous reduction of 
 so as to maintain the initial revenue level if: (i
k t t ,..., 1
n m t t   ,..., 1 + ′) the tax rates to be changed are revenue increasing, 
(i ) any good whose rate is to be changed is substitutable for the composite good consisting of all other goods, 
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When these conditions are satisfied, efficiency will be successively improved by applying this 
proposition at each step, thereby squeezing the extreme tax rate towards uniformity and bringing the tax structure 
closer to uniformity.
  
As the reform progresses and as more and more commodities share the extreme tax rates, the 
magnitudes of   and   are likely to become closer, for then the effects of idiosyncratically strong 
substitutes or complements of leisure upon the magnitudes of   and   will be diluted. In view of 






n > i ii ′
11  
Thus, we can expect that, in an economy where substitutability dominates, a squeezing of the extreme 
tax rates towards uniformity is likely to improve efficiency monotonically.  
As a result of such efficiency-improving tax reforms, uniformity will be eventually attained. Even 
then, however, there is still room for improvement from the uniform tax structure. Efficiency will be further 
improved by applying the Corlett & Hague rule to the commodity pairs that flagrantly violate Proposition2 (ii).  
 
 
                                                             
11 Even when (iii) is not satisfied at a reform stage, the tax reform towards uniformity can proceed for most tax 
rates, leaving behind some other rates. See Fukushima and Hatta (1979).  
  188. Grouping of commodities 
If a much higher tax rate is imposed on chicken than on fish, a consumer will be able to avoid paying a substantial 
amount of tax by substituting fish for chicken, regardless of the tax rates of the commodities other than this pair, 
because fish and chicken are close substitutes. An economist's intuition would be that a revenue-neutral reduction 
of the tax rate differential of this pair, leaving all other tax rates intact, would improve efficiency.  
The problem, of course, is that reducing the distortion between the two goods in question will, in 
general, cause some increase in the distortions between the two goods and other goods. Thus, the increase in the 
tax rate of fish increases the distortion between fish and goods with tax rates on the latter being lower than the tax 
on fish. We need to define the circumstances under which the positive welfare effect of reducing the distortion 
between two close substitutes dominates the negative effects arising from the accompanied increase in distortions. 
Hatta and Haltiwanger (1986) established an empirically testable criterion of strong substitutability of a 
commodity pair by which the squeezing of their tax rates improves efficiency, when all other tax rates are kept 
constant.  
  Before establishing the criteria in Proposition 3, we need to introduce a few definitions. 
Consider the initial tax structure satisfying 
n t b b a a t t t t t t ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ − + Λ Λ Λ 1 1 2 1                            (24) 
We say that goods   and   are strong substitutes relative to the goods with tax rates lower than   when 
following holds:  
a b
a t
         .                                        (25)  0 ) ( ) (
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When this inequality holds, the increase in the compensated demand for   caused by an increase in   is so 
large that it outweighs the countervailing effect caused by the reduction in all of the tax rates lower than  . We 





a b a t
  19                                               (26)  0 ) ( ) (
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a a b t t t t η η
When this inequality holds, the increase in the compensated demand for   caused by an increase in   is so 




         Finally , we say that goods a and b are strong substitutes relative to the outliers if (25) and (26) are both 
satisfied, i.e. if   and b  are strong substitutes relative to the goods with lower tax rates than   as well as to 
the goods with higher tax rates than  . 
a a t
b t
  We are now in a position to state and prove the following proposition. 
  Proposition 3. (Hatta and Haltiwanger, 1986): Suppose that the initial tax structure in the model of (￿) and (6) 
satisfies (24). 
 
Suppose also that goods   and b  are commodities and that   and t  are both revenue-increasing. Then 
efficiency is improved by an increase in  , accompanied by a revenue-offsetting reduction in  , if the 
following condition are satisfied: 
a a t b
a t b t
(i)  Good   is a substitute for all goods with a higher tax rate than   and good   is a substitute for all 
goods with a lower rate than b t
a a t b
  . 
  (ii)  Goods   and   are strong substitutes relative to the outliers.  a b
￿Proof.  The theorem will be proved by establishing that the assumptions made imply inequality (7). As in (8), 
we have  
   ∑ =













). ( η η
In view of (9), the first term on the RHS is rewritten as  
 ￿ 
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the first term is positive from (ii) and the last is positive from 
(i) under (24). Similarly, the second term of (27) can be shown to be positive.￿                                                 
  20Q.E.D. 
 
One of the best known results of optimal taxation theory is that the lowest tax rates should be imposed on the 
commodities with the highest price elasticities of demand. The underlying intuition is that this will minimize the 
tax-created deviation from the pre-tax, i.e., undistorted, allocation. The present analysis shows that, if the price 
elasticity of a commodity is extremely high because it has close substitutes, a high tax rate on this good way 
create little distortion in resource allocation, as long as a uniform tax rate is imposed on the good and its close 
substitutes. This also implies that the optimal tax rate for such a good may be quite high.  
This suggests a two-step implementation of tax reforms towards uniformity, starting at an initially 
arbitrarily divergent tax system. 
First, bundle together close substitutes and make the tax rates within each bundle uniform, while 
leaving the tax rates across different bundles different. For example, equate the tax rate for all food items, while 
also equating the tax rates for all clothing items. Each bundle may be called a compound commodity. 
Second, apply the extreme tax rate squeezing rule, treating each compound commodity as if it were a 
real commodity. Compound commodities are likely to be substitutable for each other. For example, food as a 
whole is substitutable for clothing. Thus, the sufficient conditions for efficiency improvement are likely to be 
satisfied at each successive squeezing of the extreme tax rates. 
Substitutability among composite commodities is generally weak, and the so-called inverse elasticity 
rule becomes useful when it is applied to composites. Hence it is conceivable to apply the Inverse Elasticity Rule 
after the first step above. Then we make the tax rates of the bundles inversely proportional to their demand 
elasticities.  
However, there may not be a composite with high demand elasticity; the demand elasticities may not 
be dramatically different across composites. Then we will have the situation where one tax rate is imposed on all 
the composite commodities and another analogous rate is imposed on the composite factors – a situation similar 
to uniform commodity taxation.  
  21The second step above then becomes useful in guiding us towards a uniform tax structure.  
  229. Empirical estimation of optimal tax rates 
The literature of optimal taxation emphasized the non-uniformity of optimal commodity tax rates. The 
celebrated example is Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) ,who numerically derived optimal tax rates from the 
parameter estimates of direct addilog demand functions given by Houthakker (1960). The last column of Table 1 
shows their estimates of optimal tax rates for Canada, as an example. This demonstrates that optimal tax rates are 
quite divergent. 
However, Fukushima and Hatta (1980) showed that Atkinson and Stiglitz’s estimate of the divergent 
optimal tax rates is due to latter’s assumption of unrealistically high elasticity of labor supply. When the elasticity 
of labor supply is high, wage elasticities of commodities can be widely divergent.  And hence optimal tax rate 
can be divergent, according to the theoretical analysis of the present paper. 
Fukushima and Hatta (1989) established that when the elasticity of labor supply is changed to realistic 
values in the Atkinson-Stiglitz model, the optimal tax rates become much closer to uniformity. Table 1 
reproduces their estimates of the optimal tax rates derived from the same estimates of the demand parameters, but 
under various assumed values of wage elasticities of compensated labor supply that Atkinson and Stiglitz used. 
The last two rows of the table show the gain obtained by adopting the uniform rather than the optimal tax 
structure of the same revenue as a percentage of the government revenue. The size of the gain varies greatly with 
the assumed level of labor supply elasticity. As the table shows, the gain is 135.9% of government revenue when 
the compensated wage elasticity of labor is assumed to be 3.35. It shows that if the compensated wage elasticity 
of labor supply is 0.5 or less, the efficiency cost of adopting a uniform tax structure rather than the optimal one is 
less than 5% of the government revenue. Thus the gains obtained from the tax rates optimal rather than uniform 
will be relatively small when a realistic value of elasticity of labor supply is assumed. 
12Asano and Fukushima 
(2001) also empirically shows that the optimal tax structure is close to uniformity using Japanese data. 
 
 
                                                             
12 See Gruber and Saez (2002) for recent estimates of the elasticity of taxable income. 
  23X : Equity and Commodity Taxation 
 
  In the present paper, we did not take equity considerations into account when discussing commodity 
taxation reform. There are three major reasons for this. 
  First, in order to attain equity through taxation, far more powerful instruments than commodity 
taxation are available, such as progressive income taxes, land taxes, or inheritance taxes. If we delegate the 
attainment of equity to such taxes, then the role of commodity taxation is to restore neutrality violated by the 
absence of taxation of leisure consumption itself. 
  Second, when leisure is separable in the utility function and ability is the only source of income 
differences, the optimum combination of a non-linear income tax and linear commodity taxes results in a uniform 
commodity tax rates, as Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) and Deaton (1981) have shown. Under separability 
assumption, optimal commodity tax structure in a single consumer economy is uniform. Hence their results show 
that redistributional concern does not affect the optimal tax structure when an additional policy instrument of 
non-linear income tax is available 
Third, when tax reform is viewed as part of the entire set of microeconomic policies of a government 
(including anti-trust policy, trade liberalization, and cost-benefit analysis), it should be carried out independently 
of short run equity considerations as long as each reform satisfies Samuelson’s (1950) criterion of efficiency 
improvement.  An efficiency improving policy may reduce social welfare due to income distribution effects, but 
a series of many efficiency improving reforms will have offsetting income distribution effects, and it is likely to 
bring about an improvement in social welfare in the long run. On the contrary, requiring each policy to 
monotonically improve will severely social welfare limit policy options and may prevent maximization of long 
run social welfare.
13 
  If the cumulative distributional effects of efficiency improving reforms are clearly skewed, the 
government should revise the progressivity of the income tax rather than abandon the efficiency improving 
                                                             
13 See Hatta (1986, fn. 16) for the remarks by Corden (1981) and Hicks (1941) on this. 
  24policies altogether. 
  There are also two technical reasons for not considering equity in the present paper. First, empirical 
evidence suggests that the redistribution capacity of commodity taxation is extremely limited (Sah, 1983 and Ray, 
1986). Second, estimated egalitarian optimal tax rates are sensitive to the specification of the functional forms of 






Distortions that induce over-consumption of leisure are inevitable under any combination of taxes on 
wage and commodities. The theory of optimum commodity taxation states that the efficiency-seeking 
commodity tax rates should be differentiated so as to offset the stimulating effect of wage taxation upon labor 
supply. But the differentiated commodity tax rates create new non-neutrality among the commodities themselves. 
This implies that when commodity tax rates are excessively differentiated, the welfare loss from increased 
distortion among these commodities would more than offset the welfare gain from the reduced distortion between 
leisure and other commodities. Fukushima and Hatta’s numerical computations demonstrated that only a small 
welfare loss results from adopting an optimal commodity taxation structure rather than a uniform one with an 
equal revenue yield when realistic values of labor supply elasticity are assumed. 
Following Fukushima and Hatta (1989), the rough and ready policy implication of our theoretical and 
computational analysis may be summarized as follows:  “Differentiation of tax rates among broad categories of 
goods like clothing and housing is ineffective in reducing non-neutrality between commodities and leisure 
because their cross-elasticities with leisure simply cannot be sufficiently divergent under realistic values of the 
wage elasticity of labor supply. In finer categories of commodities, there are a small number of obvious 
complements (e.g., summer homes, yachts, and golf equipment) and substitutes (e.g., washing machines, vacuum 
  25cleaners, and microwave ovens) of leisure. Their tax rates should be differentiated a la Corlett and Hague. For the 
vast majority of commodities that are not particularly strongly related to leisure, however, their tax rates should 
be made uniform.” 
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